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TAX CONSTRAINTS ON INDEXED OPTIONS
DAVID M. SCHIZER'
Indexed stock option grants reward executives for outperforming
a benchmark, such as the market as a whole or competitors in the
same industry.' These options offer superior incentives by limiting the
influence of factors beyond an executive's control, such as general
2market and industry conditions. Yet indexed options are almost
never used.3 Professor Saul Levrnore seeks to explain this puzzle w ith
norms.4 This comment on his article argues that tax plays a larger
role in this puzzle than he acknowledges, although tax is not a com-
plete explanation. Accounting and Professor Levmore's norms-based
t Associate Professor, Columbia University School of Law. Helpful comments
were received from Marvin Chirelstein,Jeffrey Gordon, and Meredith Wolf Schizer.
A traditional option gives the holder the right, but not the obligation, to pur-
chase property for a set price called the "exercise" or "strike" price. For instance, an
option might offer stock for the firm's then-current share price of $100, allowing the
executive to profit from appreciation above $100. In an indexed option, in contrast,
the exercise price fluctuates with some benchmark, such as the Standard & Poor's 500
Stock Index ("S&P 500") or an industry basket. For instance, the option might entitle
the executive to buy stock for 1/13 the value of the S&P 500 (which is assumed to be
1300 currently). For this option to yield a profit, the firm must outperform the S&P 500.
For instance, if the firm's share price doubles to $200 but the S&P 500 increases even
more to 3900, the executive makes no profit (because the option yields the right to pay
$300 for stock worth $200). On the other hand, if the stock declines to $80 but the
S&P 500 declines even more to 650, the executive makes a $30 profit. In basing pay on
relative performance, then, indexed options reward good performance even in a falling
market, without rewarding poor performers in a rising market.
2 See Bengt Holmstr6m, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELLJ. ECON. 74, 82-83
(1979) (noting that efficient compensation contracts filter out risk that is beyond an
employee's control).
The rarity of indexed options is well known and has commonly been described
as a puzzle. See, e.g., Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bu-
reaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON. 653, 683 & n.34 (1998) (noting that indexed options "would
represent a substantial improvement over current contracts" but are seldom used, and
observing that "the near complete absence of relative pay seems to be a puzzle").
The literature on norms is vast, and the term's precise meaning is debated. In
general, a norm is a rule or practice that is regularly followed but not legally enforce-
able. For a discussion, see, for example, Melvin Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social
Norms, 99 COLUM. L. Rnr. 1253, 1255-57 (1999) (classifying various types of norms);
Edward Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Wo'rk, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 1009 (1997) (exploring the role of Delaware courts in developing norms for cor-
porate managers).
-' Tax has not previously been offered as an explanation for the indexed option
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account are then briefly considered.
I. TAX CONSTRAINTS ON INDEXED OPTIONS
A. Section 162(m) and "Phony" Performance Pay
The main tax advantage of traditional options over indexed ones
derives from § 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code. A product of
populist concerns about soaring executive pay, this rule disallows a
publicly traded firm's deduction for compensation exceeding one mil-
lion dollars. Yet the rule exempts performance-based pay.3 The goal
of this exception is either to encourage such pay or, a cynic might say,
to render the measure toothless. Both traditional and indexed op-
tions qualify as performance-based, and so the deduction for either
type of option is not limited.
Traditional options have a tax advantage, though, if the parties do
not want the executive to bear too much firm-specific risk. The parties
will prefer pay that imposes less of this risk, but is still deductible.
Traditional options thread this needle. They include a bet on the
market as a whole. This value is not really performance-based, but is
treated as such for tax purposes.8 For example, the option might give
puzzle. My focus on tax is unlikely to surprise Professor Levrmore, who says: "I can
count on my commentator to pursue the tax angle and intuitions." Saul Levmore, Puz-
zling Stock Options and Compensation Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1915 n.25.6
See I.R.G. § 162(m) (1) ("In the case of any publicly held corporation, no deduc-
tion shall be allowed under this chapter for applicable employee remuneration with
respect to any covered employee to the extent that the amount of such remuneration
for the taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds $1,000,000."). The rule
applies to the chief executive officer and to the four other most highly compensated
employees. See id. § 162(m) (3) (defining "covered employee"). The term "applicable
employee remuneration" does not include any remuneration "payable solely on ac-
count of the attainment of one or more performance goals" if procedural require-
ments are satisfied. Id. § 162(m) (4) (C).
7For the typical "nonqualified" option, the employer has a deduction and the
employee has income when the option is exercised, based on the spread between the
exercise price and the value of the stock. See id. § 83; Treas. Reg. § 1.83-7. However,
the taxable event is the grant date if the option has a "readily ascertainable fair market
value," a condition that the regulations render extremely rare. "Incentive stock op-
tions" are subject to different rules, discussed below in Part I.B.
8 As Professors Johnson and Tian have shown, a single traditional option is worth
three times as much as a single indexed option on plausible assumptions. SeeShane A.
Johnson & Yisong S. Tian, The Value and Incentive Effects of Nontraditional Executive Stock
Option Plans, 57J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000) (noting that an indexed option is worth $13.56
and a traditional option is worth $40.35, assuming an at-the-money exercise price of
$100, volatility of 0.20, a risk-free rate of 8%, and a dividend yield of 2%). The differ-
ence between the two is the bet on the market as a whole. Indeed, a traditional option
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an executive the right to buy stock for the current price of $100. If
the stock appreciates to $110, the executive earns ten dollars-even if
the rest of the market doubles, so that a ten percent return is not im-
pressive. With a traditional option, even poor performers profit in a
bull market. In contrast, an indexed option does not offer this wind-
fall; executives are rewarded only for outperforming the benchmark
(for example, competitors or the market as a whole). Thus, indexed
options are more "performance-based" than traditional options, but
both are deductible. Therefore, traditional options are a tax-efficient
way to limit an executive's firm-specific risk."
1. Nonperformance Pay in Disguise: Three Pay Packages
As an illustration of this point, three alternative pay packages are
considered for an executive whose market value is $10 million per
year. To preserve its tax deduction, the firm cannot offer more than
$1 million in cash.' Thus, the remaining $9 million-or ninety per-
is comparable to an indexed option paired with an option on the market as a whole.
For instance, assume that the traditional option authorizes purchase of the stock for
S1300 (the current price). A similar economic return is also offered by two securities:
an indexed option entitling the executive to buy stock for the current value of the S&P
500 (which is assumed currently to be $1300) and an option to buy the S&P for $1300.
To make the two alternatives perfectly equivalent, a "knock out" feature should be
added to the indexed option, such that it makes no payment when the S&P option is
out of the money. In addition, loss on the indexed option would have to be "netted"
against gains on the S&P option in some cases. For a discussion of this netting effect,
see infra note 17.
" The regulations and conference report treat options as "performance based"
without requiring indexation. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e) (2) (vi) & examples 9 through
11; see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-213, pt. 4 (1993). The exercise price must be no
less than the stock price on the grant date. Cf MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION (7th ed. 1994) (noting that the legislative history of § 162(m) "ap-
parently regards 'performance' as an absolute rather than a comparative measure of
executive success").
I. Recent empirical studies confirm that firms often respect the $1 million cap (al-
though, in the current bear market, large nondeductible grants of restricted stock re-
portedly are becoming more common). For instance, one study of 376 firms docu-
mented that most responded to the enactment of§ 162(m) by qualifying top executive
pay as performance-related. See Peter Woodlock & Joseph W. Antenucci, Update: Cor-
porate Responses to Executive Compensation Deductibility Limits, TAX NOTES, Oct. 13, 1997,
at 221; see also BRAuN1 J. HALL & JEFFREY B. LIEBMAN, THE TAXATION OF ExEcurivE
COMPENSATION (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7596, 2000)
("We did find that the million dollar rule led companies to substitute performance-
based pay for salary. But our evidence suggests that this substitution was quite mod-
est .... "); Tod Perry & Marc Zenner, Pay for Performance? Government Regulation
and the Structure of Compensation Contracts (June 2000) (unpublished manuscript)
("[WAle find that after 1993 the salary growth rate is significantly smaller for firms near
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cent of the pay package-must be offered through options, which
could be indexed or traditional."
An appeal of traditional options is that a $9 million traditional
grant conveys far less firm-specific risk than $9 million of indexed op-
tions-indeed, about half as much, since traditional options also in-
clude a valuable market bet. 12 Of course, some firm-specific risk is
needed to produce useful incentives. But if too much is imposed, un-
diversified executives could demand an unduly high premium."
Moreover, as Professor Levmore emphasizes, too much firm-specific
or above the million-dollar threshold. We also find that most firms reducing salaries to
a level at or below one million dollars do so in response to 162(m). On the other
hand, these salary reductions do not lead to lower total compensation."), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?cfid=450743&cftoken=73769900&abstractid
=60956; Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using the
Tax Code to Influence CEO Compensation (Sept. 2000) (unpublished manuscript)
(finding that cash salaries cluster around $1 million, with growth in compensation
concentrated in option grants and other performance-based payments), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?cfid=450743&cftoken=73769900&abstractid
=244570. Preserving the deduction under § 162(m) reportedly has public relations
benefits, as well as tax benefits. See Perry & Zenner, supra, at 8 (citing a survey by Inves-
tor's Business Daily that indicates that eighty-seven percent of firms mentioned share-
holder relations as a reason to preserve the deduction under § 162(m)).
" The firm could also include a performance-based bonus, but this alternative is
ignored here for simplicity's sake. As discussed below, for the bonus to qualify as per-
formance-based, it must also present real firm-specific risk.
12 As Professors Johnson and Tian have shown, the indexed option grant will be
almost twice as sensitive to changes in the stock price as a traditional grant of equiva-
lent value. SeeJohnson & Tian, supra note 8, at 16-17 (noting that delta of an indexed
grant is ninety-three percent larger than delta of a traditional grant).
3 Executives are undiversified because their human capital is tied to firm per-
formance. The size of the premium will depend upon their risk preferences and the
rest of their portfolios. Too much risk is imposed if the premium rises more than the
added productivity benefits from intensifying the incentive. See BrianJ. Hall & KevinJ.
Murphy, Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options, 90 AM. ECON. REv., PAPERS &
PROCS. OF THE ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH ANN. MEETING OF THE AM. ECON. ASS'N, May
2000, at 209; see also Lisa IL Meulbroek, The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensa-
tion: Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options (Mar. 1,
2000) (unpublished manuscript) (stating that an undiversified executive's subjective
valuation of equity compensation will be lower than a diversified investor's valuation,
leading to deadweight loss when such compensation is used), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?cfid=450743&cftoken=73769900&abstract id
=215530. In response, executives theoretically could seek diversification in the deriva-
tives market. If such hedging with derivatives is feasible, executives should not receive
a premium for accepting firm-specific risk and, of course, no useful incentives would
be created. Yet tax and securities law have impeded such hedging, as should contrac-
tual limitations imposed by the firm. David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging. The
Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 501-02
(2000).
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risk could induce the executive to take foolish gambles.
If the point is to reduce firm-specific risk, traditional options are
not the only way. Instead, the firm could offer a smaller grant of in-
dexed options (for example, $4.5 million) and more cash (for exam-
ple, $5.5 million)." Yet because of § 162(m), the firm could not de-
duct $4.5 million of cash, and thus would owe almost $1.6 million of
extra tax. '
While traditional options preserve the firm's deduction, they im-
pose two offsetting costs. First, the executive must bear general mar-
ket risk. 7 Second, these options provide less effective incentives in a
falling market, a factor that may prove increasingly important in com-
ing years. To compensate the executive for these costs, the firm must
share the tax savings. For instance, the executive's option grant can
be increased from $9 million to $10 million. In some cases, a rela-
tively modest premium will suffice. Market risk in the options is ac-
ceptable if the executive would have invested in the market anyway.,$
11 As Professor Levmore notes, indexed options encourage executives to take risk,
even more than traditional options do. Risk-promoting compensation is helpful in
some cases, since executives tend to be more risk averse than diversified shareholders.
Yet too much promotion of risk could lead to risks with negative present value.
Lewnore, supra note 5, at 1922-24.
I- Se id. at 1920 (noting that incentive compatibility of traditional options can be
replicated through cash and indexed options). This package has the advantage of fil-
tering out unwanted market risk and providing useful incentives even in a bear market.
1' Loss of a $4.5 million deduction would cost the firm $1.575 million, assuming
the 35% federal corporate tax rate applies.
7 Even those who want market risk would rather get it by investing cash salary in
S&P options. If this market bet is embedded in a traditional option, profits can be off-
set by firm-specific losses. Yet such "netting" would not occur if the executive received
S&P options (or cash used to purchase them) and separate indexed options. To see
the difference, compare two scenarios. First, assume the executive receives a tradi-
tional option to buy stock for its current market price of $1300 (which is also assumed
to be the current value of the S&P 500). What if the firm stock price remains at $1300,
even though the S&P 500 increases to $2300? The executive has no profit. In contrast,
assume the executive receives an indexed option to buy stock for the current value of
the S&P 500, and also uses cash to buy a separate at-the-money S&P call option with an
exercise price of $1300. On the assumed facts, the executive nets a $1000 profit on the
S&P option. Even though the stock underperformed the S&P 500 by $1000, the ex-
ecutive has no loss on the indexed option (other than the salary foregone to get it).
Unlike the traditional option, this $1000 underperformance does not cancel out the
$1000 profit on the S&P option.
1 Set Li Jin, CEO Compensation, Diversification and Incentives 32 (Dec. 9,
2000) (unpublished manuscript) ("[T]he cost to [the] firm of moving market risk
from shareholder[s] to the CEOs is not high .... CEOs naturally want to hold
some market risk as long as it is fairly priced. Even if CEOs are given only risk-free
cash compensation, they are likely to invest some of their wealth in the risky
assets themselves ... ."), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?cfid=
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Likewise, the risk of being undercompensated in a falling market is
less daunting if executives expect to be made whole ex post, for in-
stance, through repricing of existing grants or larger future grants.
The three pay packages are compared in the following table:
Table 1: Comparison of Three Pay Packages
Pay Package Firm-Specific Risk Nondeductible
Portion
$1 million cash Intense 0
$9 million indexed concentration
option
$1 million cash Less intense 0
$9 million traditional
option
$5.5 million cash Less intense (like $4.5 million cash
$4.5 million indexed $9 million tradi-
option tional option)
2. Section 162(m) Cannot Be the Whole Story
Thus, § 162(m) inadvertently favors traditional options over in-
dexed ones-a distortion that justifies repeal of this measure. Even
so, § 162(m) is only a partial explanation. Indexed options were rare
even before this rule was enacted in 1993. In some cases, the tax
benefit to the firm should be less than the nontax cost to the execu-
tive (for example, extra market risk in a bear market). Moreover, the
rule should have less influence for firms that are subject to a low tax
rate.' 9 In addition, § 162 (m) cannot explain why less-senior executives
(who are not subject to the rule) receive traditional instead of in-
dexed grants. Finally, other compensation is not entirely perform-
ance-based, but still qualifies as such under § 162(m). For instance,
cash bonuses could be based on lax "performance" standards (for ex-
450743&cftoken=73769900&abstractid=254260. The return on the underlying stock,
and thus on the traditional option, should already include a premium for market risk.
Thus, an extra premium is more likely to be demanded for firm-specific risk (which
cannot be diversified away). See Meulbroek, supra note 13 (emphasizing "loss of diver-
sification cost" associated with firm-specific risk).
19 On the other hand, the deduction from options comes in future tax years (that
is, when options are exercised) and so a firm may be less certain, ex ante, of being in a
low bracket.
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ample, sales of at least eighty percent of last year's volume). A prob-
lem with this alternative, though, is that the tax rule requires a mean-
ingful chance of failing the performance standard. Yet such risk is
precisely what the parties may be trying to avoid."2
B. Indexing Incentive Stock Options
A second tax constraint is that so-called incentive stock options
("ISOs") arguably cannot be indexed. ISOs offer capital gain treat-
ment to the executive, albeit at the cost of no deduction for the em-
ployer."2 For the option to qualify as an ISO, the "option price" must
not be "less than the fair market value of the stock at the time such
option is granted."' This language can plausibly be read as permit-
ting indexed options as long as, on the grant date, the index is at least
as valuable as the stock price.14 However, meeting this test on the
grant date arguably is not sufficient under the regulations: The "op-
tion price"-which is defined as the price actually paid on the op-
',, ,.., Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(i) (noting that pay is not performance-
based unless the performance goal "outcome is substantially uncertain at the time the
compensation committee actually establishes the goal").
Professor Calvin Johnson has observed a tax inefficiency in any option that is
etfled with stock (whether traditional or indexed). After the option is exercised, the
executive N'ill hold stock. Unlike debt, stock generates no deductions to the firm. See
Calvin H. Johnson, Stock Compensation: The Most Expensive Way To Pay Future Cash,
52 S.M.U. L. REV. 423, 425 (1999). Yet this problem is fixed if, at the same time, the
firm borrows to repurchase shares from investors. In fact, firms commonly hedge
option grants with such leveraged equity repurchases. Cf Haim A. Mozes & Steven B.
Raymar, Granting and Hedging Employee Stock Options: A Tax Motivation and Em-
pirical Tests 4 (Sept. 15, 2000) (unpublished manuscript) ("In a dynamic hedging
strategy, the [firm] borrows funds and purchases equity when the options are
first issued."), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cftn/SSRN_ID243632_
code)l01022520.pd.ecfid=450743&cftoken=73769900&abstractid=243632. The result is
essentially the same as if the firm borrowed money to pay executives in cash (for ex-
ample, on an indexed stock appreciation right), which is the approach ProfessorJohn-
son recommends.
Specifically, the executive owes no tax upon exercising the option and will re-
port capital gain from selling the stock as long as the stock is held until at least one
)car after the date of exercise and two years after the option grant date. However, ex-
ercise of the option can trigger alternative minimum tax. See BarbaraJ. Raasch &Ju-
dith L. Rowland, Stock Option Planning, TAXES, Jan. 1999, at 39 (discussing tax treat-
mcnt of ISOs).
I.R.C. § 422(b) (4).
For instance, assume that the stock is worth $100, the S&P 500 is at $1300, and
the option's exercise price is 1/13 of the S&P 500. Under this reading of the statutory
language, the option could be an ISO. Professor Levrnore apparently reads the lan-
guage in this way. See Levmore, supra note 5, at 1913.
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tion 2 -"may be determined in any manner so long as the minimum
price possible under the terms of the option cannot be less than the fair
market value of the stock at the date of grant."26 An indexed option
cannot satisfy this condition because the exercise price could fall below
this minimum value at some point during the life of the option (for ex-
ample, as the index falls) .27
Even so, the significance of this tax constraint on indexed ISOs
should not be overemphasized. The statutory language arguably
permits ISOs to be indexed, and there is no policy reason to disfavor
indexation. As a result, the Treasury should be willing to change the
regulation. Yet to my knowledge, no one is lobbying for this reform.
Stakes are low, in any event, because ISOs are relatively uncommon.
The tax savings to the executive (which is generally the difference be-
tween the maximum tax bracket of 39.6% and the long term capital
gains rate of 20%) is usually less than the tax cost to the employer (a
35% tax). 28 As a result, these options are tax-advantaged only for firms
that do not pay corporate tax (for example, because they have losses).
(Note, though, that these are precisely the firms that would be less in-
fluenced by § 162(m)). Even for these firms, the size of ISO grants is
strictly limited. Thus, the need to qualify for ISO status is at most a
25 See Treas. Reg. § 1.421-7(e) (1) (defining option price as "the consideration in
money or other property which, pursuant to the terms of the option, is the price at
which the stock subject to the option is purchased') (emphasis added).
26 Prop. Treas. Reg. 1.422A-2(e), 49 Fed. Reg. 4504 (Feb. 7, 1984) (emphasis
added).
27 In defense of indexed options, one might read this language to require only
that the minimum price, as of the grant date, cannot be less than the fair market value
of the stock on the grant date. In other words, one could read the phrase "on the
grant date" to refer to the entire sentence, and not just the immediately preceding
language "fair market value of the stock." Yet this reading is inconsistent with the
definition of "option price" as the price actually paid (and not the price that hypo-
thetically would be paid on the grant date). See Treas. Reg. § 1.421-7(e) (1) (defining
the term "option price"). In addition, this reading yields bizarre results. What if the
exercise price equals the stock price on the grant date but is preset to decline thereaf-
ter (for example, by a dollar a day until it reaches zero)? Tested only on the grant
date, this option would qualify as an ISO. Yet this is precisely the kind of option that is
not supposed to qualify. Indeed, the prior regime for "restricted stock options" explic-
ity required the option price to be "fixed or determinable at the time the option is
granted." Otherwise, the option would be a so-called "variable price option" that was
not eligible for favorable tax treatment. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.421-1 (d) (2) (describing the
requirements for granting a restricted stock option).
28 See MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A. WVOLFSON, TAXES AND BusINEss STRATEGY
188-89 (1992) (showing that the tax cost to the firm exceeds the tax benefit to the ex-
ecutive, assuming the same tax rate governs both parties).
29 For each executive, the underlying shares cannot be worth more than $100,000
in a given year.
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partial explanation for the scarcity of indexed options.
II. ACCOUNTING
The conventional view is that financial accounting favors tradi-
tional options by not expensing them on the firm's income statement.
In contrast, indexed options are expensed; the amount of expense
varies over time, depending on changes in the option's intrinsic
value. " Professor Levmore questions the importance of this account-
ing difference. Investors in an efficient market should ignore ac-
counting conventions, he notes, and thus should prefer a better in-
centive to padded earnings.
On the other hand, when the Financial Accounting Standards
Board sought to expense option grants in the early 1990s, firms hired
lobbyists and spent political capital to block this accounting change.
Real resources are also devoted in other contexts to enhance earn-
ings." If accounting really has no significance, as some academics
suggest, why the fuss?
Since sophisticated parties often behave as if stock options ac-
counting is significant, it is worth considering reasons why they may be
Thus, for traditional options, no expense is recorded in the body of the income
statement when the option is granted or exercised. Traditional options qualify for this
treatment only if the exercise price is at least as high as the stock price on the grant
date. Under a 1995 reform, the option's grant date value (based on Black-Scholes or
other reasonable ialuation models)-but not subsequent changes in -alue-must now
be reflected in a footnote on the income statement. In contrast, because indexed op-
tions are treated as "wariable" options, the income statement includes an expense
based on the option's built-in gain during each period (that is, the option's intrinsic
Nalue, as opposed to its Black-Scholes value).
A For instance, firms used to incur extra costs to issue securities treated as debt for
tax purposes, but not for accounting purposes. See, e.g., Ellen Engel et al., Debt-Equity
Hybrid Securities, J. ACCr. RES., Oct. 1, 1999, at 249 (1999) (studying MIPS and other
securities treated as debt for tax purposes but not for rating agency and accounting
purposes, and noting that firms incur extra expenses totaling approxmately four per-
cent of the offering price to secure better accounting treatment for otheruise compa-
rable securities). Likerise, some firms have stopped engaging in tax-advantaged hedg-
ing transactions because these transactions would introduce volatility in accounting
earnings under FAS 133, a new accounting rule for derivatives. See David M. Schizer,
Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning 101 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001); see
alo Douglas A. Shackelford & TerryJ. Shevlin, Empirical Tax Research in Accounting
(Dec. 2000) (unpublished manuscript) (describing studies of the tradeoff between ac-
counting and tax reduction in the use of LIFO, compensation, depreciation, income
shifting, capital structure, acquisitions, etc.), available at http://papers.ssra.com/
so13/delihery.cfm/SSRNID235796_codeOO0828530.pdP.cfid=450743&cftoken=737699
00&abstracid=235796.
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correct. First, information can be costly." To measure the true cost of
options, investors must value them not only on the grant date, but also
over time (and for traditional options, unlike for indexed options, this
information is not supplied on accounting statements). These peri-
odic reevaluations are costly. Indeed, economists have been reluctant
to undertake this effort in a related context. Studies of the link be-
tween pay and performance usually ignore post-grant-date fluctuations
in the value of equity compensation." Since economists find these
computations daunting, it would not be surprising if investors do as
well.
Of course, some investors should be willing to bear this cost if they
could profit from superior information. For instance, assume that un-
sophisticated investors, misled by accounting conventions, bid up the
price of a given security. In a well-functioning market, sophisticated
investors, who have done enough research not to be fooled, should do
short sales that return the price to an appropriate level.34 Yet sophisti-
cated investors will not take this step unless they expect the rest of the
market to follow them within a reasonable period of time. If they ex-
pect unsophisticated investors to continue to rely on accounting
numbers, less arbitrage will be supplied."
32 See Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Traders
Have Diverse Information, 31J. FIN. 573 (1976); SanfordJ. Grossman &Joseph E. Stiglitz,
On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 393 (1980)
(showing that competitive markets break down when information is costly); cf
RICHARD A. BREALEY & SrEwART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CoRPoRATE FINANCE 363
(6th ed. 2000) (considering the possibility that investors sometimes respond slowly to
new information).
33A notable exception is the insightful study of Brian Hall and Jeffrey Liebman.
As they put it,
[i] t is worth stating from the outset why our results differ from previous find-
ings. With regard to the large literature that indicates that salary and bonus
elasticities are small, our findings differ simply because previous estimates ig-
nored changes in the value of stock and stock options, which account for vir-
tually all of the sensitivity.
Hall & Liebman, supra note 3, at 655.
34 A short sale is a bet that the market will decline. The short seller sells borrowed
property, hoping to buy it later for a lower price.
3 An analogy may be drawn to the "noise trader" literature. The existence of
speculative bubbles or panics is puzzling in an efficient market. Instead, we would ex-
pect sophisticated investors to arbitrage these price swings. For instance, if unsophisti-
cated investors (or "noise traders") are paying too much for tulips or internet stocks,
sophisticated investors should engage in short sales that yield a profit once the bubble
bursts and, indeed, should help it to burst. Why, then, do bubbles ever occur? The
"noise trader" literature contends that sophisticated investors will do these short sales
only if they expect the market to decline in the near term. If there is doubt about
when (or whether) the "noise traders" will recognize their error, arbitrage becomes
TAX CONSTRAINTS ON INDEXED OPTIONS
This is not to say that accounting alone explains the lack of in-
dexed options, although the role of accounting warrants further
study.- I agree with Professor Levmore that it is useful also to seek
explanations more consistent with a well-functioning market.
III. NONCONFLICTING FORTUNES
Professor Levmore offers a two-step argument. First, indexed op-
tions are not appropriate for all executives. His reason is that these
options can induce excessive risk-taking and thus can be given only to
executives who are readily monitored. (As a friendly amendment, he
might add that § 162(m) discourages indexed grants to some highly
compensated executives.) Second, a firm will resist giving indexed
options to a subset of executives. The problem, he argues, is that pay
of different employees could be negatively correlated, violating the
norm of "nonconflicting fortunes." In a falling market, for instance,
indexed option holders could prosper. But colleagues holding tradi-
tional options would not.
While this argument has much to commend it, two concerns come
to mind. First, are negative correlations in pay as rare as he suggests?
For instance, employees often compete for the same promotion.
Likewise, division heads may be paid for division-specific perform-
ance, with one division doing well while others do not. Second, is this
really a norms story? Instead, as Professor Levmore acknowiedges,
straightforward efficiency concerns may be at work. In avoiding nega-
tive colelations in pay, the firm may simply be building team morale
and avoiding interemployee conflict.
The more general point is that, in designing compensation pack-
ages, firms consider factors other than the two-incentives and em-
ver , risky and less of this service is supplied. See generallyJ. Bradford De Long et al.,
Noise Trader Rik in Financial Markets, 98J. POL. ECON. 703 (1990) (presenting a "model
of an asset market in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs
both affect prices and earn higher expected returns"); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H.
Summers, The Aoise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 19, 19-20 (1990)
("IS]ome investors are not fully rational and their demand for risky assets is affected by
their beliefs or sentiments that are not fully justified by fundamental news. [In addi-
tion,] arbitrage... is risky and therefore limited.").
"1 For one thing, we might expect firms that are less concerned about accounting
to implement indexed options. For instance, cable firms are said to be evaluated based
on the number of subscribers rather than on accounting earnings. Yet cable firms do
not use indexed options either.
,7 Professor Levnore acknowledges this point. See Levrnore, supra note 5, at 1933
n1.59.
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ployee risk-aversion-emphasized in the finance literature on indexed
options. For instance, it may be helpful to explain the CEO's large
pay package by saying it is performance-based, even if this is not en-
tirely the case. Thus, the ability of traditional options to offer nonper-
formance pay "in disguise"-a feature with tax advantages, as dis-
cussed above-may also facilitate dealings with unions, regulators, and
even shareholders, although sophisticated investors should not be
fooled. In addition, compensation committees may not want to be the
first to adopt a novel method of compensation. Furthermore, indexa-
tion raises the choice of a suitable benchmark. If the executive must
outperform competitors, which ones? What if the firm is a conglom-
erate? What about competitors that are not publicly traded? If the
benchmark is a particular industry, instead of the market as a whole,
executives have an incentive to imitates or scuttle competitors, even if
these efforts do not advance their own shareholders' interests." Like-
wise, if the industry is the benchmark, the executive is not credited (or
penalized) for the choice of which industry the firm is in. For instance,
a typewriter manufacturer might outperform other typewriter manu-
facturers, but managers arguably should be penalized for failing to sell
computers. On the other hand, if the benchmark is the entire mar-
ket, managers would be rewarded (or penalized) for being in a "hot"
(or "dead") sector, a result driven in part by luck. In addition, man-
agers in high "beta" firms could profit in a rising market (that is, as
the stock predictably rises more than the general market), while man-
agers in low beta firms would profit in a falling market (that is, as the
stock predictably falls less than the market).a0
More generally, the appeal of indexed options is not as straight-
forward as the finance literature suggests. Professor Levmore makes
this case elegantly and persuasively. Norms may play a role, along
38 Cf PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (1999)
(noting that when venture capitalists are evaluated on a relative basis, they may re-
spond by imitating each other's portfolios to avoid falling behind).
Professors Aggarwal and Samwick take the point one step further. They argue
that collusion among rival firms can advance shareholder (although not societal) in-
terests. Indexed options are avoided because they would impede such collusion. See
RAJESH AGGARWAL & ANDREW A. SAMWIcK, ExEcuTIvE COMPENSATION, STRATEGIC
COMPETITION, AND RELATIVE PERFORMANCE EvALUATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5648, 1996). Yet this theory
bears only on the choice not to index against industry competitors. The theory does
not explain the absence of indexation against the market as a whole.
40 Beta describes the sensitivity of a stock to general movements in the market.
Stocks with high betas are very sensitive and thus go up (and down) more than the
general market. See BREALEY& MYERS, supra note 32, at 173-75.
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with accounting, a range of governance concerns, and the tax con-
straints emphasized here.
* * * * * *
